general concept of myth applying to extrabiblical, biblical, and postbiblical religions as the history of god s or God , whereas historia sacra refers to the specifically monotheistic and biblical, both Jewish and Christian, concept of myth as history being preord ained and governed by God .
I consider Fishbane's distinction a major breakthrough in our und erstand ing not only of biblical and postbiblical history but also of ancient oriental thought in general. As an Egyptologist, I am primarily interested not so much in the shift from biblical to postbiblical Jud aism or Christianity as in the shift from prebiblical to biblical myth, and feel invited to tentatively apply Fish bane's distinction to ancient Egyptian and ancient Mesopotamian mythology. 6 ) to reject the easy construction of this shift in terms of 'myth versus monoth eism', since myth is on both sides. Yet a sh ift there is, and h is distinction between historia divina and historia sacra may perhaps provide a conceptual tool for a more convincing description of th is difference. Is it possible to describe th e contrast between the polytheistic and the biblical ways of dealing with h istory as a sh ift from historia divina to historia sacral Is th e term historia sacra applicable at all to extrabiblical ph enomena? Let us start from an attempt to define th ese terms. Historia divina is th e h istory of God or gods. This concept presupposes that God 'h as' a h istory-as opposed to the conception of a categorically transcendent and timeless God, a concept which is certainly anachronistic with respect to the Bible but central to later Ch ristian and Islamic th eology. Historia sacra is history as sh ared by God or gods in one way or other. 'Having' a history is, of course, no problem with regard to Egyptian, Babylonian, or Greek gods. Historia divina is th e proper form of speaking about gods existing in a divine world or panth eon. Historia divina is th e narrative structure of th e divine world. Its logical counterpart is not historia sacra but historia humana, to be defined as th e narrative structure of the human world. For the monotheistic concept of God, there is no divine world to sh are. 7 Th e only possibility for God to 'h ave' a h istory is to sh are the human realm of history, which by divine participation is then turned into historia sacra.
Fish bane is certainly righ t (as was Th omas Mann in h is Joseph novels
In wh at follows I will sh ift th e emph asis from th eology to h istory. By h istory, be it historia divina, historia sacra, or historia profana or humana, I understand not th e past as such, but th e narrative representation of the past. My th esis is th at such a th ing as th e narrative representation of th e past is anyth ing but normal and self-evident. It requires a general cultural option for ch ange over against identity and continuity. The past, in order to become th e subject of such a representation, must in itself possess a kind of narrative structure. There must be someth ing to tell in order to provoke a representa t ion of any importance and int erest . The concept of narration implies change and t ransforma t ion; t his addi t ional defini t ion is impor t an t . The t ypical s t ruc t ure of an event is the transformation of a situation A into it s contrary A. It is this eventstructure that makes the past narratable. If we apply this concept of narrative st ruct ure to historia divina, we meet with a plethora of myths t hat t ell of such events transforming a state A into a state A. The gods have worked all t he changes that constitute present realit y.
The past , however, in which t hese act ions t ook place is of a very specific kind. It is an 'absolut e past ' t hat keeps equal dist ance t o a moving presen t . Mircea Eliade charac t erized t his concep t of a my t hical pas t by t he La t in formula 'in illo t empore'. 8 My t hical t ime belongs t o ano t her t emporali t y than that to which historical time belongs. Events in historical time share the same temporality with the present, which means that the distance between the historical event and a given moment in present time can be measured in terms of years and months. Mythical time, on the other hand, does not allow for this form of localization and distanciation. It constitutes a temporality of its own. Its 'pastness' is of a kind that may be re-presented or 'presentified' by ritual or dramatic or rhapsodic performance.
Historia divina is about events in the absolute past, 'in illo tempore', and history is about events in the historical past with a precise place in chron ology. History as the narrative representation of the past reflects the narrative structure of the human world (in terms of events and transformations), in the same way as the narrative representation of the absolute past or myth reflects the narrative structure of the divine world.
Equipped with these definitions and conceptual tools, we can see that, in fact, there is comparatively little in terms of historia divina (in the strict sense of a narrative presentation of a divine past 'in illo tempore') in th e Bible, but an enormous number of datable events and a extraordinarily comprehensive rep resentation of the past from the first day of Creation down to the reign of the Persian king Artaxerxes. In ancient Egypt, on the other hand, there is a plethora of historia divina, that is, narrative representations of events taking place in the divine world, and a very conspicuous absence of any narrative representation of the historical or human past. Instead of history, defined as the narrative repre sentation of the past, we meet with antih istory, which may be defined as the nonnarrative representation of the past. 9 Examples of nonnarrative represen tations of the past may be found in annals and kinglists, that is, in enumerations of facts but not of events in the sense of transformatory processes that lead to something new instigating narration and remembering. Nonnarrrative repre sentations of the past are tools of chronological orientation. Narrative represen tations of the past are forms of collective memory and identity; th ey are 'th e intellectual form in which a society gives account to itself of its past', to quote Joh an Huizinga's famous definition of history. 10 They are related to memory and identity, because they tell of events that brought about, and are therefore able to explain, the present as the result of a development.
What we learn from th ese observations is th at th e past is not, as such , already an object of narrative representation. Th ere is no natural drive to represent the past in the form of historical narrative. Representing the past or 'history' requires generators of meaning in order to make the past narratable, to turn facts into events, and to relate past events to present situations. Th e early states, such as ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, h ad a strong need for ch ronological orientation but obviously not for history. This state of affairs applies above all to ancient Egypt, and is beautifully reflected in an anecdote told by Herodotus. When Hecataeus of Miletos cam e to Thebes in Egypt, he boasted of his pedigree ending with a god in the sixteenth generation. The Egyptian priests took the noble Hecataeus into their temple and showed him 341 statues of highpriests-341 generations of priests, one being the son and successor of the other, without any deity interfering. 'This m eans then,' Herodotus resum es, 'that for a tim e-period of 11,340 years, exclusively hum an kings ruled over Egypt', m aking sure that we are dealing here with an exclusively human history, or rather, past, because these 11,340 years lack the narrative structure they would need to become history. This is made clear by Herodotus' additional remarks: 'Within this time-span, the sun is reported to have changed its course several times. Twice it has risen where it now sets and has set where it now rises. But this did not cause any changes in the Egyptian world, neither in the vegetation nor in the activity of the river, nor with regard to diseases and death in the human world' (2.143). This seemingly absurd remark nonetheless offers a deep insight into the non-narrative struc ture o f the Egyptian co ncept o f the past. Narrative is about time as change. Time without change can o nly be co unted o r measured, no t narrated. The ancient Egyptian kinglist is a to o l o f timerecko ning and chro no lo gical o rientatio n, but no t a narrative representatio n o f the past. 11 The absence o f narrative representation may be called antihisto ry, since it is the result o f a cultural option against histo ry.
The distinction between history and antihisto ry go es back to Claude Levi Strauss and his distinctio n between co ld and ho t so cieties. Co ld so cieties, acco rding to LeviStrauss, 'strive, by means o f the institutions they are giving themselves, to erase quasiautomatically the effect which historical factors could have on their equilibrium and their continuity' ('grace aux institutions qu'elles se do nnent, a... annuler de faco n quasi auto matique l'effet que les facteurs histo riques pourraient avoir sur leur equilibre et leur continuite'). 'Hot societies', on the other hand, 'are characterized by a desire for change and interiorize their history (leur devenir historique) in order to make it the motor o f their devel o pment.' 12 LeviStrauss is interested in deconstructing the conventional concept of o ral so cieties as lacking histo ry. Co ldness, in his view, is not a lack but a po sitive achievement. He is right, and the decisive term is 'institution'.
I must admit that I do not believe in hot and co ld societies, but I believe in institutions producing cultural 'heat' or 'coldness', that is, freezing or empha sizing, excluding or featuring change. The Egyptian kinglist is an institutio n that freezes change, a fact perspicaciously reco gnized by Herodotus. Fo r the Egyptian understanding, change belo ngs to the time o f the go ds, when the wo rld was created and the institutio ns were founded. These are the changes that are narrated by the myths. If changes occur in the human time of history, they are interpreted as irruptions o f chaos, which may only be lamented but not nar r ated, because they lack meaning and coher ence. The Egyptian wor d for 'event', kheperut, has str ong negative connotations, as in China, wher e people wish each other well by wishing for 'eventless times'. Kheperut is something to be avoided and fenced off. In a wisdom text, we r ead that God gave humans magic as a weapon to ward off the blow of kheperut. 13 In Mesopotamia the situation is slighdy different. The Sumerian state also cr eated a king-list as a tool of time-r eckoning, which is very similar to the Egyptian king-list.
14 Both show a tripartite structure, starting with the creation of the world and a succession of gods, and then giving a list of heroes or demi gods until they pass to human kings, of whom they give a complete list down to the reigning king. 15 There is, however, a striking difference between the Egyptian and the Mesopotamian kinglists, in that the Mesopotamian list shows some remarkable beginnings of narrative elaboration. Moreover, there are not a few texts outside the kinglist tradition that stretch back over a series of different reigns into the remote past. 16 An early text of this genre, known under the title 'Curse on Aggade', 17 is the history of the rise and fall of the Sargonid Dynasty in the twentythird and twentysecond centuries BCE. Among other events, it relates how King Naramsin destroyed the temple of Enlil in Nippur, and how Enlil answered this crime by sending the Guteans, who put an end to the ruling dynasty. The NeoBabylonian 'Weidner Chron icle' (first century BCE) reaches much farther back in time. This chronicle gives an account of a series of dynasties, and connects the success of a king's reign with his attitude towards the Esagila, the temple of Marduk in Babylon. 18 In various cases, the fall of a dynasty and the transition of rule from one dynasty to another are explained by a guilt that one or several rulers accumulated during their reign. The fall of the empire of Ur is traced back to certain forfeits committed by King Shulgi. 19 The juridical concept of guilt and punishments gives meaning to history and coherence to the chain of events and the sequence of dynasties. Here, as in Egypt, the concept of 'event' is invested with rather negative connotations. But the difference between the Egyptian and the Meso potamian concepts of event is obvious. In Egypt, the event is a manifestation of chaos and contingency, without any meaning. In Mesopotamia, however, the event is full of meaning. It is read as the manifestation of the punishing will of a divinity whose anger has been raised by the king. 20 What are, in Mesopotamia, the generators of history, the factors that bestow meaning and coherence onto past facts and turn them into narratable events? Two ideas seem to me decisive for the Mesopotamian concept of history: one is the idea of 'connective justice', the connection of guilt and punishment that connects events in terms of cause and consequence; 21 and the other is the role of the gods, who intervene in human history as agents of punishment We see that we are not dealing here with purely human history, but with a kind of history in which the gods are heavily involved, and that it is this divine involvement that tu rns facts into events and makes the past narratable. In other words, history emerges in Mesopotamia as historia sacra, at least in its incipient stages. The biblical concept of historia sacra implies these same two ideas: 'connective ju stice' and divine intervention. Divine intervention is not su fficient to define the biblical concept of history; it clearly defines the event, but not the concat enation of events into a coh erent storyline. Th e concept of h istory needs connectives, such as causality: event A led to a state B, which th rough divine intervention or any other event C was transformed into a state D, and so forth. This connective principle is provided by 'connective justice'. In oth er words, connective justice functions like causality, defining an ensuing event not just as an 'effect' but in terms of reward and punish ment. 22 In Mesopotamia the gods appear as the agents of justice. This has much to do with divination, wh ich played an absolutely central role in Babylonia. Every th ing depends on the correct interpretion of the signs expressing the will of the gods. A sign points to a future event and presupposes a finality between the will of th e gods and th e vicissitudes of h istory. In Egypt th e will of th e gods is absorbed in the task of maintaining the world; in Mesopotamia the divine will is sufficiently free to extend its range into human affairs. As a result, history forms a realm of religious meaning and experience, and becomes a matter of discursive communication and representation. 23 Even in Egypt, th is model grows more and more influential and leads to considerable ch anges, especially in th e h is toriograph ical genres: th e private autobiograph y and th e royal inscriptions. 24 Th e traditional th eology of maintenance is complemented by a theology of will that imbues the realm of kheperut ('all that happens') with meaning. In Mesopotamia th e gods intervene in h istory because th ey are explicitly invited to do so. The theologization of history results from certain institutions of international law. Unlike Egypt, wh ich knew a central government righ t from th e start, Mesopotamia went th rough a long period of polycentrism, with citystates related to each other by treaties and conflicts. In this situation Mesopotamia formed concepts and institutions not only of national but also of international law. Th e political institutions of th e citystate were able to maintain justice with in th e state, but for th e maintenance of law and order among th e various states th e gods were made responsible. Th ey were called upon to watch over the strict observance of the treaties between states and to punish any transgressions. Treaties h ad to be sealed by a solemn oath sworn by both parties submitting th emselves to divine supervision. 25 In th e same way as the legal institutions of the state maintain justice inside the state, so th e will and th e 'wrath ' of the gods maintain justice between states. Th is tradition of international law leads in th e Hittite Empire to th e formation of two different contexts for th e representation of th e past. One is the sam e as in Mesopotam ia: the context of justice and guilt. When a catastrophe occurs, it will be traced back to the intervention of an offended deity. The typical offence is the violation of a treaty. Divine wrath can only be reconciled by confession and repentance. This leads to discourses of historical reconstruction. The m ost elaborate exam ples are the confessory prayers of King Mursilis, who after twenty years of pestilence tried to reconcile the gods by publicly confessing a sin committed m ore than twenty years before by his father, who broke a treaty with the Egyptians by attacking the Syrian town of Am qa, which then belonged to Egypt. These prayers, together with the annals of his father, Shuppiluliuma, telling the sam e story, figure among the m ost elaborate pieces of cuneiform historiography. 26 The other context of reconstructing the past is the Hittite custom of introducing state treaties with a long recapitulation of the com m on history of both parties forming the alliance. The alliance is built upon the foundation of a past of m utual friendship and support, giving reason to believe in the stability of the contract and the loyalty of the partners. 27 A third genre of representing the past is the royal apology. This genre too flourishes in Hittite historiography, which has transm itted to us the m ost im pressive and elaborate exam ples, especially the historical accounts of usurpers such as Telepinus or Hattusilis III. These usurpers want to justify their illegitimate ascension to the throne by pointing out the obvious blessing the gods bestow on their reign, or pointing out the injustice of their prede cessor s, the ensuing misfortunes, and the turn for the better brought about by their own r ule. 28 All three of these traditional genr es of cuneiform histor iogr aphy come to their fullest fr uition only in the Bible, wher e they develop into lar gescale compositions compr ising one or even sever al entir e books. The fir st for m, which we may call confessor y histor iogr aphy, gene r ates in the Bible the 'Deuter onomic' tr adition of histor ywr iting, in which ever y r eign is judged according to the principle of the king's obedience to the law and which, with few exceptions, is a long story of disobedience, disloyalty, apostasy, injustice, and idolatr y-in shor t, a story of an accumulation of guilt leading finally to the catastrophe of the destruction of Jerusalem and the Babylonian exile. The second form, which may be called covenantal history, lies behind the books of Exodus and Deuter onomy, wher e the law-that is, the tr eaty p r ope r -is int r oduced by the history of how God inter vened for the redemption of his chosen people. The book of Deuter onomy contains not only the histor ical intr oduction and the body of stipulations, but even the curses that tr adition ally for m the close of a tr eaty. 29 The thir d fo r m, the r oyal apology, is r ep r esented in the Bible by the elaborate accounts dedicated to the r eigns of kings Sau l , David, and So l omon, and especia l l y to David, whose dynastic l egitimacy was more than dubious. 30 Bib l ica l historiography is the apex of Mesopotamian and Hittite traditions of history-writing. The devel opment that l eads in the Bib l e to its u l timate perfection can be identified as the sacralization of history. The idea of forming an al l iance with God Himsel f, and with one God onl y instead of appointing several gods as supervisors of pol itical al l iances, draws this one chosen God much cl oser into the ups and downs of his chosen peopl e than had been the case in Mesopotamia and its neighboring civil izations. There, history was just a fiel d of possibl e favourabl e or punishing interventions by the gods; now it turns into one coherent connection of events, stretching from creation unti l the end of the world, known as historia sacra in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Within the frame of historia sacra, the concatenation of events is structured not onl y by reward and punishment but a l so, and above a l l , by promise and providence. Historia sacra is not onl y a representation of the past, but al so a project and a program. This aspect seems to be lacking in Mesopotamia.
The Mesopotamian and Hittite conceptions of history emerge, as we have seen, in the context of moral and l ega l thinking, and remain to be c l ose l y connected to the notions of law, guilt, verdict, and punishment, right through the entire biblical tradition up to its secularized version in Hegel's phil osophy of history, as most cl earl y expressed in his formula 'Die Weltgeschichte ist das Wel tgericht', which is a quote from Schiller's poem Resignation. No concept of history coul d cl aim more actual ity for our present concern with the repre sentatio n o f the past than this mo st ancient and o riginal co ncept o f histo ry. Especially in Germany, guilt has co nfirmed itself as the stro ngest and mo st pro ductive generato r o f histo rical disco urse. The juridical frame of acco unt giving, of accepting responsibility not o nly for one's own deeds but also for a past stretching into several generatio ns o f predecesso rs, especially in the internatio nal co ntext o f alliances to be fo rmed and maintained, remains o r beco mes again the mo st pro minent co ntext fo r the the reco nstructio n and co mmunicatio n o f the past.
Where in this tableau, however, is the place of human history, historia profana, s o to speak, histo ry as a purely human affair without divine impact? It is this questio n that leads to the reco gnitio n o f Hero do tus as the 'father o f histo ry'. Hero do tus seems to have been the first writer to narrate the past for its own sake, to interpret events as co nsequences no t o f divine interventio n but o f human decisio ns and actions. He seems also to have been the first to ask for causality and not fo r justice in the co urse o f histo ry. In this respect, Christian Meier, fo r instance, is right to reco gnize o nly the wo rk o f Hero do tus as histo rio graphy, and to exclude all that has emerged in the ancient Near East lo ng befo re Hero do tus in fo rms o f narrative representatio ns o f the past. 31 Meier no t o nly deni es these Mesopotamian and biblical forms of representing the past any claim to be recogni zed as hi stori ography, he even takes them to be the contrary of hi stori ography, that is, to belong to myth. For Meier, Herodotus' epoch-maki ng achi evement consi sts i n the destructi on of the very constructions that, i n the anci ent Near East, had made possible the articulation and representation of time past. Only the emanci pati on from sense-maki ng assumpt i ons of normat i ve truth ('there cannot be what must not be') and connecti ve justice (morally bad acti ons lead to disastrous results for the actor) opens the way for the contingency of hi story, i ts 'Ei gensi nn'. Seen from the vantage-poi nt of thi s posi ti on, the or i ental and bi bli cal forms of historiography appear as the opposite of hi story, as the quintessential manifestations of what had to be overcome in order to break through towards history proper. 32 The soundness of Meier's arguments cannot be deni ed. If we consider the Greek concept of hi story, both historia divina and historia sacra appear as myth. Fi shbane's di sti ncti on makes i t possi ble to solve thi s problem. There seem to be two di fferent ki nds of myth: one based on historia divina and related to mythi cal ti me, the absolute past 'i n i llo tempore'; and the other based on historia sacra and related to historical time. These myths are made of the stuff of hi story: they are not about the bi rth and death, the acti ons and sufferi ngs of gods and demi-gods, but of human bei ngs. However, they are not just narrative representations of the past as a series of events, but foundati onal stori es that defi ne the i denti ty, the central values, and the common i deals of a group. Reservi ng the term 'myth' for narrati ves concerni ng historia divina would mean denyi ng narrati ves such as the stori es of the Exodus from Egypt the status of myth. F i shbane i s certai nly ri ght to i nclude the stori es of the Exodus, Si nai , the wi lderness, and conquest, or the stori es about the patr i ar chs, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, in his concept of myth. These ar e without any doubt foundational stories determining the memory and identity of Israel as a religious and ethnic community, taking place not 'in illo tempor e' but in histor ical time (however fictional this placement may be).
However , may we perhaps go further and gener alize the concept of historia sacra so far as to include all myths that ar e not historia divina taking place 'in illo tempor e', but that ar e r elated to histor ical time? May we go so far as to allow other people, r eligions, cultur es, and societies a historia sacra of their own, o r is this concept by definition r est r icted to the JudaeoCh r istian context? To be sur e, the concept of historia sacra has semantic elements that defy any extension beyond biblical monotheism, Jewish or Chr istian. One such element is, above all, the concept of paganism, which is implied in its opposite term, historia profana. Historia prof ana is the history of the 'peoples', the 'nations' {goyim, gentium), as opposed to the histor y of the one chosen people. The concept of historia sacra r ests, therefore, on what I have called the 'Mosaic distinction'. 33 We have to weaken the concept of hi stori a sacra by this distinction between true religion and paganism in order to be able to under stand the foundational myths of other peoples as their h i stor i ae sacrae. They are then to be defined as representations of their specific normative past based on: (a) a concept of connective justice or morality; (b) a notion of sacrality, be it the will of God or an emphatic notion of community, nation, and empire; and (c) an idea of promise, project, or program involving goals to achieve, ideals to realize, and values to enforce. I am wondering whether, in an age of globalization, this weak or extended notion of h i stor i a sacra is not gaining momentum. There are goals that 'we', as humanity and inhabitants of this endangered planet, must achieve, and there are things we must never forget in order to achieve these goals.
NOTES

